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Political Competition in Dual Economies: Clientelism in Latin America

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  • M.Rojas, Angela

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    Abstract

    Resumen:Este artículo presenta el proyecto de investigación que intenta iluminar los mecanismos que vinculan el clientelismo con la informalidad. En particular la investigación se concentra en las interacciones que tienen lugar durante la competencia electoral e intenta proporcionar un marco analítico para comprender los mecanismos económicos subyacentes en la competencia electoral en América Latina. Esta competencia está caracterizada por asimetrías entre los políticos (credibilidad y habilidad para movilizar votantes) y asimetrías entre los votantes (ingreso y participación en cierto segmento de la economía) ambos inmersos en un ambiente de baja calidad institucional (débil imperio de la ley). El artículo expone la evidencia empírica que motivó la investigación, discute los conceptos y literatura centrales y presenta un ejercicio exploratorio basado en el modelo de votación probabilística como un punto de partida en la formalización del problema. En esta primera aproximación se muestra que el político clientelista en el poder puede proveer más bienes públicos cuando su maquinaria política es suficientemente rentable y la sociedad es altamente inequitativa. En la medida en que el político entrante tiene su nicho en los votantes ricos quienes demandan bajos impuestos, el político clientelista redistribuye más ingreso aunque a costa de una mayor informalidad.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DE ANTIOQUIA - CIE in its series BORRADORES DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMÍA with number 008103.

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    Length: 37
    Date of creation: 31 Jan 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:col:000196:008103

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    Related research

    Keywords: maquinaria política; clientelismo; política redistributiva; dualidad; informalidad; modernización económica; América Latina;

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    1. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Guillermo E. Perry & William F. Maloney & Omar S. Arias & Pablo Fajnzylber & Andrew D. Mason & Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007. "Informality : Exit and Exclusion," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6730, October.
    3. Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2006. "Inequality and Informality," CEPR Discussion Papers 5545, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Alviar Ramírez, Mauricio & Restrepo Patiño, Medardo & Gallón Gómez, Santiago, 2002. "Un modelo RSDAIDS para las importaciones de madera de Estados Unidos y sus implicaciones para Colombia," MPRA Paper 859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    6. Robinson, James A & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," CEPR Discussion Papers 3205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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