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La corrupción en Colombia: un análisis integral

Author

Listed:
  • Jhorland Ayala-García
  • Jaime Bonet-Morón
  • Gerson Javier Pérez-Valbuena
  • Eduardo José Heilbron-Fernández
  • Jéssica Dayana Suret-Leguizamón

Abstract

Este trabajo hace una revisión de literatura sobre los estudios de corrupción en Colombia, las principales definiciones, algunos hechos estilizados y sus formas de medición. Asimismo, se presentan las series de las principales medidas de corrupción disponibles en Colombia con base en datos de entidades como la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), la Procuraduría General de la Nación (PGN) y la Fiscalía General de la Nación (FGN). Siguiendo a Henao e Isaza (2018), se identifican medidas para la corrupción generalizada y la corrupción organizacional. Dentro de esta última se analizan indicadores para la corrupción pública y la privada. Los resultados sugieren un aumento importante en la corrupción para el período 2010-2016. Sin embargo, la naturaleza compleja de este fenómeno hace muy difícil derivar conclusiones regionales y muestra en algunas ocasiones resultados contradictorios. Por ejemplo, mientras que los datos de la PGN ubican a los Nuevos Departamentos en los primeros lugares en cuanto a sanciones disciplinarias, los procesos de responsabilidad fiscal de la CGR sugieren que la mayor corrupción se presenta en los departamentos de la zona cafetera y la región central. Asimismo, departamentos como La Guajira tienen el menor número de condenas de la FGN asociados a casos de corrupción, pero es la entidad territorial con mayor presupuesto de obras inconclusas por habitante después del Putumayo. Por tanto, los resultados en materia de evolución de la corrupción y los rankings que se quieran realizar dependerán significativamente del indicador y los datos que se utilicen. **** ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the studies on corruption in Colombia, the main definitions, some stylized facts and their type of measurements. Likewise, it presents the series of the main corruption measures available in the country based on data from entities such as the Contraloría General de la Nación (CGR), the Procuraduría General de la Nación (PGN), and the Fiscalía General de la Nación (FGN). Following Henao and Isaza (2018), we identify measures for widespread corruption and organizational corruption. Within the latter, this paper analyzes indicators for public and private corruption. The results suggest a significant increase in corruption for the period 2010-2016. However, the complex nature of this phenomenon makes it very difficult to draw regional conclusions and sometimes shows contradictory results. For example, while the PGN data places the Nuevos Departamentos in the first places in terms of disciplinary sanctions, the CGR's fiscal responsibility processes suggest that the greatest corruption occurs in the departments of the coffee and central regions. Similarly, departments such as La Guajira have the lowest number of FGN convictions associated with corruption cases, but it is the department with the highest budget for unfinished public works per inhabitant after Putumayo. Therefore, the results regarding the evolution of corruption and the rankings to be made will depend significantly on the indicator and the data used.

Suggested Citation

  • Jhorland Ayala-García & Jaime Bonet-Morón & Gerson Javier Pérez-Valbuena & Eduardo José Heilbron-Fernández & Jéssica Dayana Suret-Leguizamón, 2022. "La corrupción en Colombia: un análisis integral," Documentos de Trabajo Sobre Economía Regional y Urbana 20080, Banco de la República, Economía Regional.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000102:020080
    DOI: 10.32468/dtseru.307
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corrupción; ineficiencia; entes de control; diferencias regionales; corruption; inefficiency; control entities; regional differences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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