Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
AbstractThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial voting rule in which truth-telling always constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of voting rules where, given a mediator, truthful preference revelation is always in strong equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the family of feasible elimination procedures has the foregoing property.
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Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
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- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007. "Mediators Enable Truthful Voting," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp451, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 2002.
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Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 395-423
- Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007.
"Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium,"
Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
dp463, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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