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Standard vs random dictator games: On the effects of role uncertainty and framing on generosity

Author

Listed:
  • Ernesto Mesa-Vazquez

    (Universidad de Valencia, ERICES)

  • Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de Granada & Economic Science Institute (ESI), Chapman University)

  • Amparo Urbano

    (Universidad de Valencia, ERICES)

Abstract

We show that generosity is affected when we vary the level of role uncertainty, i.e., the probability that the dictator’s decision will be implemented. We also show that framing matters for generosity in that subjects are less generous when they are told that their choices will be implemented with a certain probability, compared with a setting in which they are told that their choices will not be implemented with certain probability.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Mesa-Vazquez & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Amparo Urbano, 2021. "Standard vs random dictator games: On the effects of role uncertainty and framing on generosity," Working Papers 21-17, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-17
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/354/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Amparo Urbano, 2019. "Standard vs random dictator games. The effect of role uncertainty on generosity," ThE Papers 20/05, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ahrens, Steffen & Bosch-Rosa, Ciril, 2023. "Motivated beliefs, social preferences, and limited liability in financial decision-Making," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dictator games; generosity; role uncertainty; framing effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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