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Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives)

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Author Info
Paul R. Gregory (University of Houston and Hoover Institution, Stanford University)
Philipp J.H. Schr oder (Aarhus School of Business, Denmark)
Konstantin Sonin () (CEFIR/NES)

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Abstract

This paper sheds light on dictatorial behavior as exemplified by the mass terror campaigns of Stalin. Dictatorships – unlike democracies where politicians choose platforms in view of voter preferences – may attempt to trim their constituency and thus ensure regime survival via the large scale elimination of citizens. We formalize this idea in a simple model and use it to examine Stalin’s three large scale terror campaigns with data from the NKVD state archives that are accessible after more than 60 years of secrecy. Our model traces the stylized facts of Stalin’s terror and identifies parameters such as the ability to correctly identify regime enemies, the actual or perceived number of enemies in the population, and how secure the dictators power base is, as crucial for the patterns and scale of repression.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0091.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0091

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Related research
Keywords: Dictatorial systems; Stalinism; Soviet State and Party archives; NKVD; OPGU; Repression;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Curley Effect," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1956, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Overland, Jody & Simons, Kenneth L & Spagat, Michael, 2000. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 2653, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521671422 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-19, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Valery Lazarev, 2005. "Economics of One-Party State: Promotion Incentives and Support for the Soviet Regime1," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 47(2), pages 346-363, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma : to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 816, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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