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Present-Focused Preferences and Sin Goods Consumption at the Extensive and Intensive Margins

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  • Zarko Kalamov
  • Marco Runkel

Abstract

This paper analyzes sin goods consumption when individuals exhibit present-focused preferences. It considers three types of present focus: present-bias with varying degrees of naiveté, Gul-Pesendorfer preferences, and a dual-self approach. We investigate the incentives to deviate from healthy consumption (the extensive margin). In the first model, the extensive margin of consumption is independent of the degree of present-bias and naiveté. Likewise, in the latter frameworks, the strength of temptation and the cost of self-control do not affect the extensive margin. Hence, present-focused preferences affect the intensive margin of sin goods consumption, but not the extensive margin.

Suggested Citation

  • Zarko Kalamov & Marco Runkel, 2020. "Present-Focused Preferences and Sin Goods Consumption at the Extensive and Intensive Margins," CESifo Working Paper Series 8237, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zarko Y. Kalamov & Marco Runkel, 2022. "Taxation of unhealthy food consumption and the intensive versus extensive margin of obesity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(5), pages 1294-1320, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    present-bias; self-control; temptation; dual-self; sin goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D15 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior

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