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Private Paternalism, the Commitment Puzzle, and Model-Free Equilibrium

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  • David Laibson

Abstract

Paternalism is a policy that advances an individual's interests by restricting his or her freedom. In a setting with present-biased agents, I characterize the scope of private paternalism—paternalism implemented by private institutions. Private paternalism arises from two channels: (i) agents who seek commitment because they hold sophisticated beliefs about their present bias, and (ii) agents (naive or sophisticated) who use model-free forecasts to choose organizations that have a history of generating high experienced utility flows for their members (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999b). When naive consumers are common, private paternalism will be shrouded, explaining why commitment mechanisms are typically shrouded in the labor market (the commitment puzzle). Private paternalism has greater traction when production occurs in the formal sector instead of the informal (household) sector, where monitors are not always present, able, or willing to implement socially efficient forcing mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • David Laibson, 2018. "Private Paternalism, the Commitment Puzzle, and Model-Free Equilibrium," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 1-21, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:108:y:2018:p:1-21
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181124
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    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pandp.20181124
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Tontrup & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 2022. "Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 594-676, September.
    2. Olckers, Matthew, 2021. "On track for retirement?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 76-88.
    3. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Projective Paternalism," NBER Working Papers 26119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Eilat, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir & Mu, Xiaosheng, 2021. "Bayesian privacy," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
    5. Zhang, Qing & Greiner, Ben, 2021. "Time inconsistency, sophistication, and commitment: An experimental study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    6. Zarko Kalamov & Marco Runkel, 2020. "Present-Focused Preferences and Sin Goods Consumption at the Extensive and Intensive Margins," CESifo Working Paper Series 8237, CESifo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy

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