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On the Organizational Structure of Multinational Firms - Which Sourcing Mode for which Input?

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  • Verena Nowak
  • Christian Schwarz
  • Jens Suedekum

Abstract

Recent studies indicate that firms often outsource standard and simple tasks, while keeping complex and important inputs inside their boundaries. This observation is difficult to reconcile with the property rights approach of the firm, which suggests that important components should be outsourced in order to properly incentivize the respective suppliers. In this paper we introduce economies of scope into a property rights model where a producer contracts with two suppliers. The organizational decision is driven by two countervailing effects: the ownership rights effect favors outsourcing, while the “indirect” effect via the suppliers’ costs favors vertical integration of both inputs. If production is highly component-intensive, and if one input is much more important than the other, we show that vertical integration of the “more important” and outsourcing of the “less important” supplier is chosen in equilibrium. We also consider an open economy setup where the producer decides whether to offshore inputs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3823.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3823

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Keywords: multinational firms; outsourcing; intra-firm trade; property rights approach;

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References

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  1. Defever, Fabrice & Toubal, Farid, 2013. "Productivity, relationship-specific inputs and the sourcing modes of multinationals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 345-357.
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  29. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Schwarz, Christian & Suedekum, Jens, 2014. "Global sourcing of complex production processes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 123-139.

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