Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation
AbstractThis paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal cases, we find that a lawyer substantially increases the firm’s probability of winning at trial but has little effect on the worker’s victory probability. The UK data contain award and litigation costs and allow us to compute the pay-off matrix. We do not find evidence of a prisoner’s dilemma, given that the total pay-off for the worker is not significantly different whether she is represented or not. Surprisingly, the dominant strategy for the firm is not to be represented.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3084.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
litigation; lawyers; labour dispute resolution; prisoner’s dilemma;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Halla, 2007.
"Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers,"
Economics working papers
2007-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, 2012. "Bargaining and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 116-132, February.
- George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
- Olivier Blanchard & Thomas Philippon, 2004. "The Quality of Labor Relations and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 10590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
- Hirshleifer, Jack & Osborne, Evan, 2001. " Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 169-95, July.
- Allen McDowell, 2003. "From the help desk: hurdle models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(2), pages 178-184, June.
- Kooreman, Peter, 1994. "Estimation of Econometric Models of Some Discrete Games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 255-68, July-Sept.
- Wilde, Joachim, 2000. "Identification of multiple equation probit models with endogenous dummy regressors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 309-312, December.
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
- Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-44, September.
- Kooreman, P., 1994. "Estimation of econometric models of some discrete games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377584, Tilburg University.
- Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, 1987. "The impact of attorneys and arbitrators on arbitration awards," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(4), pages 543-555, July.
- Algan, Yann & Cahuc, Pierre, 2007. "La société de défiance : comment le modèle social français s'autodétruit ?," Opuscules du CEPREMAP, CEPREMAP, number 09.
- Yu-Fu Chen & Michael Funke, 2010.
"Global Warming And Extreme Events: Rethinking The Timing And Intensity Of Environmental Policy,"
Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics
236, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
- Yu-Fu Chen & Michael Funke, 2010. "Global Warming and Extreme Events: Rethinking the Timing and Intensity of Environmental Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3139, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michael Funke & Yu-Fu Chen, 2010. "Global warming and extreme events: Rethinking the timing and intensity of environment policy," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 21007b, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
- Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael, 2010. "Global Warming And Extreme Events: Rethinking The Timing And Intensity Of Environmental Policy," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-48, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Michael Funke & Yu-Fu Chen & Aaron Mehrota, 2011. "Global warming and extreme events: Rethinking the timing and intensity of environment policy," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers 21105, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.