Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful
AbstractWe show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2623.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
minimum wages; unemployment; asymmetric information; labour market regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
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