Cake Division by Majority Decision
AbstractWe consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, using a suitable refinement concept. In any equilibrium, the first agent offers the whole cake to the second proposal-maker, who in turn offers the whole cake back to the first agent. The third agent is then indifferent about dividing the cake between himself and the first or the second agent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1872.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
division of a cake; majority decisions; tie-breaking rules;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-01-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2007-01-02 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2007-01-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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