Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 50 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- White, Lucy, 2008. "Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 211-231, January.
- Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Do redistributive schemes reduce inequality between individuals?," Working Papers 26, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes,"
Staff General Research Papers
10130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Foncel, Jérôme & Treich, Nicolas, 2005.
"Fear of Ruin,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Foncel, Jérôme & Treich, Nicolas, 2005. "Fear of Ruin," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003.
"The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
- Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12234, Maastricht University.
- Peters,Hans & Köbberling,Vera, 2000. "The Effect of Decision Weights in Bargaining Problems," Research Memoranda 037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997.
"Loss aversion and bargaining,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1997006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May.
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2006. "Cake Division by Majority Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1872, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aase, Knut K., 2008. "The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
- David Dickinson, 2009. "The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 69-101, January.
- Bottom, William P., 1998. "Negotiator Risk: Sources of Uncertainty and the Impact of Reference Points on Negotiated Agreements," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 89-112, November.
- Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Graff Zivin, Joshua & Small, Arthur A., 2003. "Risk sharing in Coasean contracts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 394-415, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.