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Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes

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Author Info
Roth, Alvin E
Rothblum, Uriel G

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 50 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 639-47
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:639-47

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  1. Jérôme Foncel & Nicolas Treich, 2005. "Fear of Ruin," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 289-300, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jonathan Shalev, 2002. "Loss Aversion and Bargaining," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 201-232, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peters,Hans & Köbberling,Vera, 2000. "The Effect of Decision Weights in Bargaining Problems," Research Memoranda 037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  6. Oscar Volij, 1999. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Economic theory and game theory 010, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008. "On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Eugenio Peluso & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Do redistributive schemes reduce inequality between individuals?," Working Papers 26, Università di Verona, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche. [Downloadable!]
  9. Aase, Knut K., 2008. "The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2006. "Cake Division by Majority Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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