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Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roth, Alvin E
Rothblum, Uriel G
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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica .
Volume (Year): 50 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 639-47
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:50:y:1982:i:3:p:639-47Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/ More information through EDIRC
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Jérôme Foncel & Nicolas Treich, 2005.
"Fear of Ruin ,"
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Jonathan Shalev, 2002.
"Loss Aversion and Bargaining ,"
Theory and Decision ,
Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 201-232, May.
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Other versions: Ehud Kalai, 1983.
"Solutions to the Bargaining Problem ,"
Discussion Papers
556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Eric van Damme, 1984.
"The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal ,"
Discussion Papers
597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Peters,Hans & Köbberling,Vera, 2000.
"The Effect of Decision Weights in Bargaining Problems ,"
Research Memoranda
037, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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Oscar Volij, 1999.
"On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes ,"
Economic theory and game theory
010, Oscar Volij.
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Kohlscheen, Emanuel & O’Connell, Stephen, 2008.
"On Risk Aversion in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
878, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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"Do redistributive schemes reduce inequality between individuals? ,"
Working Papers
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Aase, Knut K., 2008.
"The Nash Bargaining Solution vs. Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate ,"
Discussion Papers
2008/5, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
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Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2006.
"Cake Division by Majority Decision ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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White, Lucy, 2006.
"Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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