The Impact of Asymmetric Information Among Competing Insurgent Groups: Estimating an 'Emboldenment' Effect
AbstractThis paper uses asymmetric access to information to test if an insurgency is factionalized. If it is factionalized, regional variation in information should influence attack levels as groups use violence to compete over visibility, resources and support. Using plausibly exogenous variation in satellite access, we show that attacks increased after the release of information on satellite television about US commitment to remain in Iraq. Because insurgents shift attacks toward more difficult (military) targets, the relative increase in attacks is offset by fewer total fatalities. Our findings illustrate that insurgent groups may be decentralized strategic actors subject to competitive forces.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp1018.
Date of creation: Oct 2010
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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
Iraq war; asymmetric information; media and violence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-13 (All new papers)
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