This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pablo Amorós () (Universidad de Málaga)
M. Socorro Puy () (Univ. Málaga)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We propose a multidimensional spatial model of political competition where the advertising campaign aims at influencing the weights that voters’ preferences assign to different political issues. The campaign strategies will move the vote of those voters who lack of partisan identification. The equilibrium analysis of the proposed electoral game yields insights into the chances that the ex-ante loser political party has of winning the elections when there is electoral campaign. We show that the ex-ante loser can end up winning the elections even when (1) it has less campaign funds than its opponent and, (2) it has no advantage on any single political issue.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200420.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2004/20.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_20

Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/ Bailén 50. 41001 Sevilla
Phone: (34) 955 055 210
Fax: (34) 955 055 211
Email:
Web page: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Teresa Rodríguez).

Related research
Keywords: Election campaign; political issues; preferences manipulation; positional voting.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, 1978. "Advertising and Welfare," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.