A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation
AbstractWe propose a multidimensional spatial model of political competition where the advertising campaign aims at influencing the weights that voters’ preferences assign to different political issues. The campaign strategies will move the vote of those voters who lack of partisan identification. The equilibrium analysis of the proposed electoral game yields insights into the chances that the ex-ante loser political party has of winning the elections when there is electoral campaign. We show that the ex-ante loser can end up winning the elections even when (1) it has less campaign funds than its opponent and, (2) it has no advantage on any single political issue.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2004/20.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Election campaign; political issues; preferences manipulation; positional voting.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
- Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May.
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