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Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs

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  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Niskanen, Esko

Abstract

Governmental facilities for such services as education, health, and transportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich, thereby lowering taxes. For the same reason, the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs, or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California Transportation Center in its series University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers with number qt9vk9r6zm.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt9vk9r6zm

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Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences;

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References

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  1. Sonstelie, Jon, 1982. "The Welfare Cost of Free Public Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 794-808, August.
  2. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1989. "Public Provision Of Private Goods And The Redistribution Of Income," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper 36, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  3. Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Steffen Burchhardt & Christoph Starke, 2010. "Target-Group and Quality Decisions of Inequity-Averse Entrepreneurs," FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management 100011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  2. Christoph Starke, 2012. "Serving the many or serving the most needy?," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 365-386, December.
  3. Kangsik, Choi, 2012. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly revisited," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 37704, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Mar 2012.
  4. Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  5. Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 2005. "The melting pot and school choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 871-896, June.
  6. Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 1996. "The political economy of mixed public and private schooling: A dynamic analysis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-310, July.
  7. Christoph Starke, 2010. "Serving the Many or Serving the Most Needy?," FEMM Working Papers, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management 100002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  8. Kangsik, Choi, 2011. "Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 34100, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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