Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes
AbstractA linear tax on an externality-generating activity may not attain the first-best social optimum. The problem arises because a monopolistâ€™s gain from improving the characteristics of a product may differ from the social gain, even when consumers are willing to pay for the change.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California Transportation Center in its series University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers with number qt4hx0h53n.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
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Regulation; Externalities; Taxes; Social and Behavioral Sciences;
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, Amihai, 1997. "Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 255-257, February.
- Glazer, Amihai, 1997. "Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt1dc291j6, University of California Transportation Center.
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