Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes
A linear tax on an externality-generating activity may not attain the first-best social optimum. The problem arises because a monopolist's gain from improving the characteristics of a product may differ from social gian, even when consumers are willing to pay for change.Â
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