Management of a Common Currency
AbstractThis paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of two countries using a common currency. The goal is to study how the monetary arrangement influences the optimum financing of a public good. If the two countries are allowed to print the common currency autonomously, they will finance their fiscal spending with money, oversupplying the public good and crowding out the private sector. The possibility to export part of the inflation creates a distortion in incentives such the resulting equilibrium is strictly welfare inferior to the one prevailing under flexible exchange rates. If the management of the common currency is deferred to an international central bank, each country will try to use domestic policy variables (taxes) to manipulate in its favor the actions of the bank. With no independent domestic taxes, the bank can improve welfare. However, its policies naturally support the larger country, and to induce the smaller one to participate requires giving it a disproportionately large, politically unrealistic, representation in the bank's objective function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt5jv1h7nt.
Date of creation: 22 Sep 1988
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common currency; International Central Bank; international coordination; Social and Behavioral Sciences;
Other versions of this item:
- Alessandra Casella & Jonathan Feinstein, 1988. "Management of a Common Currency," NBER Working Papers 2740, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandra Casella and Jonathan Feinstein., 1988. "Management of a Common Currency," Economics Working Papers 8891, University of California at Berkeley.
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