Comment on "Promises and Partnership"
AbstractCharness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 11/14.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 11 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
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Experiment; promises; partnership; guilt aversion; psychological game theory; trust; lies; social distance; behavioral economics; hidden action;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-04-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-04-23 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-04-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2011-04-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011.
"Words Speak Louder Than Money,"
Working Papers in Economics
11/13, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Ismayilov, H. & Potters, J.J.M., 2012. "Promises as Commitments," Discussion Paper 2012-064, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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