Separating reputation, social influence, and identification effects in a dictator game
AbstractThis study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators' actions than the social influence and identification.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 53 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Experimental economics Dictator game Indirect reciprocity Reputation Social influence;
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