Patterns of Transmission Investment
AbstractThis paper examines a number of issues associated with alternative analytical approaches for evaluating investments in electricity transmission infrastructure, and institutional arrangements to govern network operation, maintenance and investment. The relationships between transmission investments driven by opportunities to reduce congestion and loss costs and transmission investment driven by traditional engineering reliability criteria are discussed. Reliability rules play a much more important role in transmission investment decisions today than do economic investment criteria as depicted in standard economic models of transmission networks. These models fail to capture key aspects of transmission operating and investment behaviour that are heavily influenced by uncertainty, contingency criteria and associated engineering reliability rules. I illustrate how the wholesale market and transmission investment frameworks have addressed these issues in England and Wales (E&W) since 1990 and in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the U.S. since 2000.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0527.
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Note: CMI, IO
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
L51; L14; L43; L94;
Other versions of this item:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-29 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joskow, P.L., 2004.
"Transmission Policy in the United States,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0454, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07.
- repec:reg:wpaper:110 is not listed on IDEAS
- William Hogan & Juan Rosellón & Ingo Vogelsang, 2010.
"Toward a Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
1025, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- William Hogan & Juan Rosellón & Ingo Vogelsang, 2010. "Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 113-143, October.
- Juan Rosellon & William Hogan & Ingo Vogeslang, 2007. "Toward a Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion," Working papers DTE 389, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Vincent Rious & Jean-Michel Glachant & Yannick Perez & Philippe Dessante, 2009.
"L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés,"
- Vincent Rious & Jean-Michel Glachant & Yannick Perez & Philippe Dessante, 2009. "L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(3), pages 819-829.
- de Nooij, Michiel, 2011. "Social cost-benefit analysis of electricity interconnector investment: A critical appraisal," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 3096-3105, June.
- Thomas-Olivier Léautier & Véronique Thelen, 2009. "Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 127-153, October.
- Richard O’Neill & Emily Fisher & Benjamin Hobbs & Ross Baldick, 2008. "Towards a complete real-time electricity market design," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 220-250, December.
- Isamu Matsukawa, 2009. "Regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity of reliability differentiated service," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 199-217, October.
- Hung-po Chao & Shmuel Oren & Robert Wilson, 2005. "Restructured Electricity Markets: Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000238, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Matsukawa, Isamu, 2006. "Regulating a Monopoly Offering Priority Service," MPRA Paper 991, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Claire Bergaentzlé, 2012. "Particularités d'adoption des compteurs intelligents au Royaume-Uni et en Allemagne : entre marchés de comptage libéralisé et règles à mettre en place pour un réel smart grid intégré," Post-Print halshs-00793322, HAL.
- Adrien De Hauteclocque & Vincent Rious, 2008. "Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe," Post-Print hal-00338296, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.