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Fiscal Interactions and the Costs of Controlling Pollution from Electricity

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  • Parry, Ian

    ()
    (Resources for the Future)

Abstract

This paper quantifies the costs of controlling SO2, carbon, and NOx emissions from power generation, accounting for interactions between environmental policies and the broader fiscal system. We distinguish a dirty technology (coal) that satisfies baseload demand and a clean technology (gas) that is used during peak periods, and we distinguish sectors with and without regulated prices. Estimated emissions control costs are substantially lower than in previous models of fiscal interactions that assume a single, constant returns technology and competitive pricing. The results are reasonably robust to alternative scenarios, such as full price deregulation and market power in the deregulated sector.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-04-27.

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Date of creation: 15 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-04-27

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Keywords: electricity generation; pollution control; fiscal interactions; price regulation; multiple technology;

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References

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  1. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Banzhaf, H. Spencer, 2002. "Efficient Emission Fees in the U.S. Electricity Sector," Discussion Papers dp-02-45, Resources For the Future.
  2. Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07.
  3. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry & Dallas Burtraw, 1996. "Revenue-Raising vs. Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Pre-Existing Tax Distortions," NBER Working Papers 5641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, 1998. "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry," NBER Working Papers 6463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Richard Blundell & Thomas MaCurdy, 1998. "Labour supply: a review of alternative approaches," IFS Working Papers W98/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  6. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1997. "Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-Existing Distortions," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9703, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  7. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Bharvirkar, Ranjit & Paul, Anthony, 2001. "Restructuring and Cost of Reducing NOx Emissions in Electricity Generation," Discussion Papers dp-01-10-rev, Resources For the Future.
  8. Williams, Roberton III, 2002. "Environmental Tax Interactions when Pollution Affects Health or Productivity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 261-270, September.
  9. Parry, Ian & Goulder, Lawrence & Williams III, Roberton, 1997. "When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets," Discussion Papers dp-97-18-rev, Resources For the Future.
  10. Borenstein, Severin & Bushnell, James & Knittel, Chris, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," Staff General Research Papers 31548, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Fischer, Carolyn, 2003. "Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and Imperfect Competition," Discussion Papers dp-02-60, Resources For the Future.
  12. Richard S.J. Tol & Samuel Fankhauser & Richard G. Richels & Joel B. Smith, 2000. "How Much Damage Will Climate Change Do? Recent Estimates," Working Papers FNU-2, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Sep 2000.
  13. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Bharvirkar, Ranjit & Paul, Anthony, 2001. "The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading," Discussion Papers dp-01-30-, Resources For the Future.
  14. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
  16. David Pearce, 2003. "The Social Cost of Carbon and its Policy Implications," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 362-384.
  17. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry & Roberton C. Williams III & Dallas Burtraw, 1998. "The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting," NBER Working Papers 6464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
  19. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, 2000. "Policy analysis in the presence of distorting taxes," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 603-613.
  20. Victor R. Fuchs & Alan B. Krueger & James M. Poterba, 1998. "Economists' Views about Parameters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1387-1425, September.
  21. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen & Bharvirkar, Ranjit & Paul, Anthony, 2001. "Cost-Effective Reduction of NOx Emissions from Electricity Generation," Discussion Papers dp-00-55-rev, Resources For the Future.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ian Parry & Hilary Sigman & Margaret Walls & Roberton Williams, 2005. "The Incidence of Pollution Control Policies," Departmental Working Papers 200504, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. Banzhaf, H. Spencer & Chupp, B. Andrew, 2012. "Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 449-464.
  3. James Alm & H. Spencer Banzhaf, 2011. "Designing Economic Instruments for the Environment in a Decentralized Fiscal System," Working Papers 1104, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  4. Palmer, Karen & Butraw, Dallas & Kahn, Danny, 2006. "Simple Rules for Targeting CO2 Allowance Allocations to Compensate Firms," Discussion Papers dp-06-28, Resources For the Future.
  5. Joseph E. Aldy & Alan J. Krupnick & Richard G. Newell & Ian W.H. Parry & William A. Pizer, 2009. "Designing Climate Mitigation Policy," NBER Working Papers 15022, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Parry, Ian W.H., 2007. "Are the costs of reducing greenhouse gases from passenger vehicles negative?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 273-293, September.
  7. Burtraw, Dallas & Evans, David A., 2009. "Tradable rights to emit air pollution," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 53(1), March.

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