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Social Influence in Legal Deliberations

Author

Listed:
  • Chaim Fershtman

    (Tel Aviv University)

  • Uzi Segal

    (Boston College)

Abstract

Juries, appellate courts, parole boards are all institutes that need to make collective decisions. What characterizes these institutes is that they are typ- ically engage in deliberations prior to decision making. Beyond information exchange, such deliberations also aim to affect the opinions, preferences and votes of other members. Using a model of social influence, we demonstrate how deliberation and voting procedures affect the voting outcome even when the same information is available to all. We then demonstrate the ability of a “designer” to manipulate the deliberation procedure in order to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2020. "Social Influence in Legal Deliberations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 999, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 12 Sep 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:999
    Note: previously circulated as "Social Influence in Committee Deliberation"
    as

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    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp999.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2018. "Preferences and Social Influence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 124-142, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friederike Mengel, 2021. "Gender Bias In Opinion Aggregation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1055-1080, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee; social influence; deliberation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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