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Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities

Author

Listed:
  • Scott Duke Kominers

    (Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago)

  • Tayfun Sönmez

    (Boston College)

Abstract

To encourage diversity, branches may vary contracts' priorities across slots. The agents who match to branches, however, have preferences only over match partners and contractual terms. Ad hoc approaches to resolving agents' indifferences across slots in the Chicago and Boston school choice programs have introduced biases, which can be corrected with more careful market design. Slot-specific priorities can fail the substitutability condition typically crucial for outcome stability. Nevertheless, an embedding into a one-to-one agent--slot matching market shows that stable outcomes exist and can be found by a cumulative offer mechanism that is strategy-proof and respects unambiguous improvements in priority.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:806
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2012. "On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 984-989.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2014. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives," Working Papers 2014-21, FEDEA.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
    3. Bó, Inácio, 2016. "Fair implementation of diversity in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 54-63.
    4. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    5. Abizada, Azar, 2016. "Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    6. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
    7. Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2016. "Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 72-75.
    8. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2014. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 232-251.
    9. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2013. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment. N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 14.05 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result" (August 2014)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    10. Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Responsive affirmative action in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 69-105.
    11. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-01215998 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Itai Ashlagi & Peng Shi, 2014. "Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1247-1264, December.
    14. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2014. "Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences," Working Papers halshs-00980794, HAL.
    15. Philipp D. Dimakopoulos & Christian-Philipp Heller, "undated". "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014005, Berlin School of Economics.
    16. Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, "undated". "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    17. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz & Turhan, Bertan, 2015. "On relationships between substitutes conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 10-12.
    18. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2014. "Cumulative offer process is order-independent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 37-40.
    19. Federico Echenique & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "How to Control Controlled School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2679-2694, August.
    20. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    21. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Weiwei Hu & Parag A. Pathak, 2013. "Small High Schools and Student Achievement: Lottery-Based Evidence from New York City," NBER Working Papers 19576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Andre Veski & Kaire Põder, 2016. "Strategies in the Tallinn School Choice Mechanism," Research in Economics and Business: Central and Eastern Europe, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, vol. 8(1).
    23. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2014. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: A General Result. N.B.: This paper replaces Nr 13.09 "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment", (June 2013)," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 14.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Design; Matching with Contracts; Stability; Strategy-Proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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