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On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching

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  • Kominers, Scott Duke

Abstract

In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with contracts model is unitary, in the sense that every contractual relationship between a given firm–worker pair is specified in a single contract. Conversely, I show that unitarity is essentially necessary for the embedding result.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 984-989

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:984-989

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Many-to-many matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract design; Unitarity;

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References

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  1. Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus & Markus Walzl, 2007. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-046, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2008.
  2. Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
  3. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
  4. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
  5. Michael Ostrovsky, 2008. "Stability in Supply Chain Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 897-923, June.
  6. Tayfun S�nmez, 2013. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186 - 219.
  7. John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 176-208, February.
  8. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
  9. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-50, March.
  10. Federico Echenique, 2012. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 594-601, February.
  11. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. N. Roketskiy, 2012. "Farsightedly Stable Matchings," Working Papers 12-26, NET Institute.
  2. Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2013. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching: Comment," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 783, Boston College Department of Economics.
  4. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2011. "Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States Military Academy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 782, Boston College Department of Economics.
  5. Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.

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