Farsightedly Stable Matchings
AbstractWe study the properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in application to matching models. We show that the result by Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) for hedonic games can be extended to a general matching with contracts framework: a collection of singleton stable sets constitutes a weak core of the matching with contracts game. We also show that singleton stable sets are invariant under different contractual languages.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 12-26.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
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farsighted stable sets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-11-03 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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