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Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers

Author

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  • Philipp D. Dimakopoulos

    (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Economics)

  • Christian-Philipp Heller

    (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department of Economics)

Abstract

We study the allocation of German lawyers to different regional courts for their compulsory legal traineeship. The number of applicants exceeds the number of available positions in a given time period in some regions, so that not all lawyers can be matched simultaneously. As a consequence some lawyers have to wait before they obtain a position. First, we analyse the currently used Berlin mechanism and demonstrate that it is unfair and that it does not respect improvements. Second, we introduce a matching with contracts model, using waiting time as the contractual term, for which we suggest an appropriate choice function for the courts that respects the capacity constraints of each court for each period. Despite the failure of the unilateral substitutes condition, under a weak assumption on lawyers’ preferences, a lawyer-optimal stable allocation exists. Using existing results, we can show that the resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, fair and respects improvements. Third, we extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time. Creation Date: 2014-11-01

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp D. Dimakopoulos & Christian-Philipp Heller, "undated". "Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labour Market for Lawyers," BDPEMS Working Papers 2014005, Berlin School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2014005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Many-to-One Matching; Matching with Contracts; Stability; Slot-Specific Priorities; Waiting Time; Legal Education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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