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The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Brañas-Garza

    (Universidad de Granada)

  • Teresa García-Muñoz

    (Universidad de Granada)

  • Shoshana Neuman

    (Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Brañas-Garza & Teresa García-Muñoz & Shoshana Neuman, 2009. "The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited," Working Papers 2009-23, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-23
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    File URL: https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-23.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
    2. Pablo BraÒas-Garza & Shoshana Neuman, 2004. "Analyzing Religiosity within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish Catholics," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-22, March.
    3. Robert J. Barro & Rachel McCleary, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pyne, Derek Arnold, 2010. "A model of religion and death," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 46-54, January.
    2. Jaime Ortiz, 2009. "Does Religion Distribution Matter in the Economic Growth of Latin America?," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 8(3), pages 183-199, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    carrot/stick; high-stakes incentives; rewards; punishment; Economics of Religion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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