The Big Carrot:High-Stakes Incentives Revisited
AbstractUsing an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-23.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec
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carrot/stick; high-stakes incentives; rewards; punishment; Economics of Religion;
Other versions of this item:
- BraÃ±as-Garza, Pablo & GarcÃa-MuÃ±oz, Teresa & Neuman, Shoshana, 2008. "The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6666, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pablo BraÃ±as-Garza & Teresa GarcÃa-MuÃ±oz & Shoshana Neuman, 2008. "The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited," Papers on Economics of Religion, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. 08/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Brañas-Garza, Pablo & García Muñoz, Teresa & Neuman, Shoshana, 2008. "The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 3287, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
- Pablo BraÃ’as-Garza & Shoshana Neuman, 2004.
"Analyzing Religiosity within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish Catholics,"
Review of Economics of the Household, Springer,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-22, 03.
- Garza, Pablo Brañas & Neuman, Shoshana, 2003. "Analyzing Religiosity Within an Economic Framework: The Case of Spanish Catholics," IZA Discussion Papers 868, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Robert J. Barro & Rachel McCleary, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jaime Ortiz, 2009. "Does Religion Distribution Matter in the Economic Growth of Latin America?," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 8(3), pages 183-199, December.
- Pyne, Derek Arnold, 2010. "A model of religion and death," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 46-54, January.
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