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Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market

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  • Kaniska Dam
  • David Pérez-Castrillo

Abstract

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous landlords and heterogeneous tenants. We model the landlord- tenant economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the equilibrium of this market. In equilibrium, contracts are Pareto optimal, and the incremental surplus generated in a landlord-tenant relationship accrues to the tenant. We also suggest policy measures in relation to efficiency and income distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaniska Dam & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2003. "Equilibrium Limited Liability Contracts in a Landlord-Tenant Market," Working Papers 99, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:99
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Pandey, Priyanka, 2000. "Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 303-326, December.
    2. Kaniska Dam, 2003. "Financial Intermediation and Credit Market Equilibrium: A Model of Matching Market," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200301, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance.
    3. Barros, F. & Macho-Stadler, M., 1995. "Competition for Managers and Market Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 320.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Sengupta, Kunal, 1997. "Limited liability, moral hazard and share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 393-407, April.
    5. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
    6. Dam Kaniska & Perez-Castrillo David, 2006. "The Principal-Agent Matching Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-34, August.
    7. Bhaskar, V, 2002. "Relative Performance Evaluation and Limited Liability," Economics Discussion Papers 8852, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    8. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September.
    9. Ray, Tridip & Singh, Nirvikar, 2001. "Limited liability, contractual choice, and the tenancy ladder," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 289-303, October.
    10. Serfes, Konstantinos, 2005. "Risk sharing vs. incentives: Contract design under two-sided heterogeneity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 343-349, September.
    11. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
    12. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January.
    13. Newman, Andrew, 2002. "Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World," CEPR Discussion Papers 3469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; limited liability; endogenous matching; optimal contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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