Welfare of Naive and Sophisticated Players in School Choice
AbstractTwo main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show that these results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yet knowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 575.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
School Choice; Naive Players; Welfare; Veil of Ignorance;
Other versions of this item:
- Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A., 2012. "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 172-174.
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2011. "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice," Economics Working Papers 1280, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-05-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2012-05-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-05-15 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-52, September.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2011. "On the Justice of Decision Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 1-16.
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