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On the Justice of Decision Rules

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Author Info

  • Jose Apesteguia
  • Miguel A. Ballester
  • Rosa Ferrer

Abstract

Which decision rules are the most efficient? Which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax? We study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives. A key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined, particularly simple, and well known: the class of scoring rules. We provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration: utilitarianism (efficiency), maximin, and maximax. The optimal utilitarian scoring rule depends crucially on the probability distribution of the utilities. The optimal maximin (respectively maximax) scoring rule takes the optimal utilitarian scoring rule and applies a factor that shifts it towards negative voting (respectively plurality voting). Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdq023
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-16

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:78:y:2011:i:1:p:1-16

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Cited by:
  1. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2011. "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice," Economics Working Papers 1280, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  2. Giles, Adam & Postl, Peter, 2014. "Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 31-52.
  3. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2011. "A Measure of Rationality and Welfare," Working Papers 573, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Núñez Matias & Valleta Giacomo, 2012. "The informational simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
  6. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Economics Working Papers 1302, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Optimal Mechanism Design without Money," Working Papers tecipa-481, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  8. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Statistical utilitarianism," MPRA Paper 49561, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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