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Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions

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  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Ori Heffetz
  • Clayton Thomas

Abstract

A menu description presents a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses the reports of other players to describe $i$'s menu: the set of $i$'s potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from her menu. Can menu descriptions better expose strategyproofness, without sacrificing simplicity? We propose a new, simple menu description of Deferred Acceptance. We prove that -- in contrast with other common matching mechanisms -- this menu description must differ substantially from the corresponding traditional description. We demonstrate, with a lab experiment on two elementary mechanisms, the promise and challenges of menu descriptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.13148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran Canetti & Amos Fiat & Yannai A. Gonczarowski, 2023. "Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms," Papers 2302.05590, arXiv.org.
    2. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ofer Glicksohn & Ori Heffetz & Assaf Romm, 2022. "Deferred Acceptance with News Utility," NBER Working Papers 30635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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