Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil
AbstractWe report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of local procurement processes involving mismanagement or corruption by about 17 percentage points. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care servicesâ€” measured based on user satisfaction surveysâ€”or compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Fam�lia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 554.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
corruption; rents; local governments; law enforcement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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