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Informalidad: teoría e implicaciones de política

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Author Info
Daniel Mejía ()
carlos Esteban Posada ()

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Abstract

En este artículo desarrollamos un modelo de equilibrio general que explica la coexistencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio estable y de un grado óptimo de imposición estatal (enforcement) de las normas (el pago de un impuesto) que son acatadas por el sector formal y violadas por el informal. La existencia de relaciones no lineales entre la producción y los recursos productivos, las normas públicas de costoso acatamiento y la posibilidad de violarlas (a costa de perder los beneficios que reporta la formalidad) son condiciones de co-existencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio. Uno de los resultados es éste: si la tarifa efectiva de impuestos se aparta de la óptima las producciones total y formal serán inferiores a las que podría alcanzar la sociedad. Esa pérdida de producción (pérdida de eficiencia estática) es la medida del costo social de la informalidad. Solucionar el problema elevando el grado de enforcement de las normas puede no ser adecuado en vista de que el gasto público en enforcement tiene un costo de oportunidad. Los resultados indican la existencia de un nivel óptimo de enforcement de las normas y de una pena óptima para quien las viole.

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Paper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number 455.

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Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:455

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Related research
Keywords: Producción; normas públicas; informalidad; enforcement; gasto Público. Classification JEL: K10; K20; K42; O17.;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Friedrich Schneider, 2005. "Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: What Do We Really Know?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Mincer, Jacob, 1976. "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages S87-104, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Feige, Edgar L., 1990. "Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: The new institutional economics approach," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 989-1002, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Maloney, William F, 1999. "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 275-302, May.
  6. Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 395-416, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2002. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Loayza, Norman V. & Rigolini, Jamele, 2006. "Informality trends and cycles," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4078, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Pratap, Sangeeta & Quintin, Erwan, 2006. "The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets and Employment," Working Papers RP2006/130, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  11. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. repec:bep:eapcon:v:8:y:2008:i:1:p:2055-2055 is not listed on IDEAS
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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