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Informalidad: teoría e implicaciones de política

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  • Daniel Mejía

    ()

  • carlos Esteban Posada

    ()

Abstract

En este artículo desarrollamos un modelo de equilibrio general que explica la coexistencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio estable y de un grado óptimo de imposición estatal (enforcement) de las normas (el pago de un impuesto) que son acatadas por el sector formal y violadas por el informal. La existencia de relaciones no lineales entre la producción y los recursos productivos, las normas públicas de costoso acatamiento y la posibilidad de violarlas (a costa de perder los beneficios que reporta la formalidad) son condiciones de co-existencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio. Uno de los resultados es éste: si la tarifa efectiva de impuestos se aparta de la óptima las producciones total y formal serán inferiores a las que podría alcanzar la sociedad. Esa pérdida de producción (pérdida de eficiencia estática) es la medida del costo social de la informalidad. Solucionar el problema elevando el grado de enforcement de las normas puede no ser adecuado en vista de que el gasto público en enforcement tiene un costo de oportunidad. Los resultados indican la existencia de un nivel óptimo de enforcement de las normas y de una pena óptima para quien las viole.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Banco de la Republica de Colombia in its series Borradores de Economia with number 455.

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Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:455

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Related research

Keywords: Producción; normas públicas; informalidad; enforcement; gasto Público. Classification JEL: K10; K20; K42; O17.;

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References

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  1. Pratap, Sangeeta & Quintin, Erwan, 2006. "The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets and Employment," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) RP2006/130, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  2. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
  3. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "Corruption and the shadow economy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/03, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  4. Edgar L. Feige, 2003. "Defining And Estimating Underground And Informal Economies: The New Institional Economics Approach," Development and Comp Systems 0312003, EconWPA.
  5. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  6. Mincer, Jacob, 1976. "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages S87-104, August.
  7. Maloney, William F., 1998. "Are labor markets in developing countries dualistic?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1941, The World Bank.
  8. Masatlioglu Yusufcan & Rigolini Jamele, 2008. "Informality Traps," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-24, December.
  9. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
  10. Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 395-416, December.
  11. Maloney, William F, 1999. "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 275-302, May.
  12. Loayza, Norman V. & Rigolini, Jamele, 2006. "Informality trends and cycles," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4078, The World Bank.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luis Armando Galvis A., 2012. "Informalidad laboral en las áreas urbanas de Colombia," COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, FEDESARROLLO, FEDESARROLLO.
  2. Camilo Mondragón-Vélez & Ximena Peña & Daniel Wills, 2010. "Labor Market Rigidities and Informality in Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE 006717, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  3. Mesa Callejas, Ramon Javier & Lopez Gonzalez, Mauricio & Gonzalez Henao, Jenifer, 2009. "Medición y características del mercado laboral del Municipio de Rionegro, Antioquia
    [Measurement and characteristics of labor market Rionegro, Antioquia]
    ," MPRA Paper 34507, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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