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An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

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  • Francesc Llerena (Universitat Rovira i Virgili - CREIP)
  • Marina Nunez (Universitat de Barcelona)
  • Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona)

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

Abstract

On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the inter- section between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al (1979).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 286.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2012286

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Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
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  1. Toda, Manabu, 2005. "Axiomatization of the core of assignment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 248-261, November.
  2. Guillermo OWEN, 1992. "The Assignment Game : The Reduced Game," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 25-26, pages 71-79.
  3. Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels, 2011. "A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game," Working Papers in Economics 260, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  4. Solymosi, Tamas & Raghavan, Tirukkannamangai E S, 1994. "An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 119-43.
  5. Sasaki, Hiroo, 1995. "Consistency and Monotonicity in Assignment Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 373-97.
  6. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  7. Rochford, Sharon C., 1984. "Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 262-281, December.
  8. Maike Hoffmann & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "The Shapley value of exact assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 557-568, April.
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