A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
AbstractIn this note we prove that the kernel of a bilateral assignment game is always included in the core. This solves an outstanding open problem for bilateral assignment games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received January 1997/Final version June 1997
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