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Francesc Llerena Garrés

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This is information that was supplied by Francesc Garrés in registering through RePEc. If you are Francesc Llerena Garrés , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Francesc
Middle Name: Llerena
Last Name: Garrés
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RePEc Short-ID: pga573

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
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Affiliation

Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública (CREIP)
Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials
Universitat Rovira I Virgili Tarragona
Location: Reus, Spain
Homepage: http://www.urv.cat/creip/
Email:
Phone: 977 75 98 00
Fax: 977 75 98 10
Postal: Avinguda de la Universitat 1 - 43204 Reus
Handle: RePEc:edi:crurves (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2013. "The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core," Working Papers 2072/212194, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  2. Francesc Llerena (Universitat Rovira i Virgili - CREIP) & Marina Nunez (Universitat de Barcelona) & Carles Rafels (Universitat de Barcelona), 2012. "An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game," Working Papers in Economics 286, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  3. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2012. "An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution," Working Papers 2072/203157, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  4. Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels, 2011. "A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game," Working Papers in Economics 260, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  5. Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez & Carles Rafels, 2010. "The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games," Working Papers in Economics 246, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  6. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2010. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games," Working Papers in Economics 245, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  7. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella, 2008. "A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations," Working Papers 327, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2005. "On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games," Working Papers 160, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2005. "The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach," Working Papers in Economics 144, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  10. Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games," Working Papers in Economics 123, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  11. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Francesc Llerena & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2004. "Sequential decisions in allocation problems," Working Papers in Economics 116, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.

Articles

  1. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2013. "Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 313-322, July.
  2. Francesc Llerena & Cori Vilella, 2013. "An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1438-1445.
  3. Francesc Llerena & Marina Nunez, 2011. "A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3275-3285.
  4. Llerena, Francesc, 2007. "An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 80-84, April.
  5. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2007. "Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 603-615, April.
  6. Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles, 2006. "The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 373-379, February.
  7. Izquierdo, Josep M. & Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles, 2005. "Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 318-330, November.
  8. Francesc Llerena-Garrés, 2000. "Una nota sobre valoración de opciones americanas y arbitraje," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 207-218, January.

NEP Fields

8 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2012-12-10
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2004-12-12 2005-09-29 2010-10-23 2010-11-20 2012-11-11 2012-12-10 2013-06-24. Author is listed
  3. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2012-12-10
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-11-11 2012-12-10. Author is listed

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