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Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core

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  • Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

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    Abstract

    A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely games with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on the properties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both the Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set.

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    File URL: http://www.ere.ub.es/dtreball/E03110.rdf/at_download/file
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 110.

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    Length: 20 pages
    Date of creation: 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2003110

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    Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
    Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
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    1. Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo, 1989. "Clan games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
    3. Izquierdo, Josep M. & Rafels, Carles, 2001. "Average Monotonic Cooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 174-192, August.
    4. Potters, J.A.M. & Poos, R. & Tijs, S.H. & Muto, S., 1989. "Clan games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154241, Tilburg University.
    5. Slikker, M. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Information Sharing Games," Discussion Paper 2000-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
    7. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    8. Voorneveld, M. & Tijs, S.H. & Grahn, S., 2003. "Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91573, Tilburg University.
    9. Marco Slikker, 2000. "Inheritance of properties in communication situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 241-268.
    10. Ron Holzman, 2001. "The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 543-553.
    11. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
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