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note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games


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  • Toru Hokari

    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA)

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    We show that the nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games, and that this lack of monotonicity holds even if there are as few as four agents.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 133-137

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:133-137

    Note: Received May 1999/Revised version December 1999
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    Keywords: Nucleolus; convex games; aggregate-monotonicity;


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    Cited by:
    1. Yair Tauman & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 171-175, March.
    2. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2006. "The Aggregate-Monotonic Core," Working Papers 280, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Hans Keiding, 2011. "Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 107-118, May.
    4. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December.
    5. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    6. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, 08.
    7. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    8. Yanovskaya, E. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Monotonicity Problems of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games," Discussion Paper 2008-102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    9. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.


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