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note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games

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Author Info
Toru Hokari () (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA)
Abstract

We show that the nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games, and that this lack of monotonicity holds even if there are as few as four agents.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 133-137
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:133-137

Note: Received May 1999/Revised version December 1999
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Related research
Keywords: Nucleolus; convex games; aggregate-monotonicity;

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  1. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yanovskaya, E. & Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Monotonicity Problems of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games," Discussion Paper 2008-102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," Cahiers de recherche 12-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jens Leth Hougaard & Hans Keiding & Lars P. Østerdal, 2002. "Monotonicity of Social Optima With Respect to Participation Constraints," Discussion Papers 03-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Yair Tauman & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions," Discussion Papers 13, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]
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