On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions

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On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions

Author Info

Yair Tauman (Tel Aviv University and Stony Brook University)
Andriy Zapechelnyuk () (University of Bonn and Kyiv School of Economics)

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Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Abstract

Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

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Paper provided by Kyiv School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 13.

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Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:13

Note: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Andriy Zapechelnyuk).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2009-01-31 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Potters, Jos & Poos, Rene & Tijs, Stef & Muto, Shigeo, 1989. "Clan games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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