On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions
AbstractAggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kyiv School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 13.
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision: Oct 2009
Note: Published in International Journal of Game Theory 39, 171-175 (2010)
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Cooperative games; aggregate monotonicity; axiomatic solution; core; Shapley value; nucleolus;
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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