AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 1 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994.
"The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games,"
1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
- Tijs, Stef & Meca, Ana & Lopez, Marco A., 2005. "Benefit sharing in holding situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(1), pages 251-269, April.
- Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar, 2003. "Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core," Working Papers in Economics 110, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
- Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2006.
"Convex Games versus Clan Games,"
2006-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Tijs, Stef & Borm, Peter & Lohmann, Edwin & Quant, Marieke, 2011. "An average lexicographic value for cooperative games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 213(1), pages 210-220, August.
- R. Branzei & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano & S. Tijs, 2009. "Multi-choice clan games and their core," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 123-138, July.
- Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Muto, S. & Ishihara, S. & Fukuda, E., 2002. "Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules," Discussion Paper 2002-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Platz, Trine Tornøe & Hamers, Herbert & Quant, Marieke, 2012. "C-complete sets for compromise stable games," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 25/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
- José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2005.
"Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal,"
Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 103-114, 07.
- Izquierdo, Josep M. & Rafels, Carles, 2001. "Average Monotonic Cooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 174-192, August.
- Yair Tauman & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009.
"On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions,"
13, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
- Funaki, Y. & Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2007. "Leximals, the Lexicore and the Average Lexicographic Value," Discussion Paper 2007-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Rodica Branzei & Dinko Dimitrov & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Convex games, clan games, and their marginal games," Working Papers 368, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.