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Political Pandering and Bureaucratic Influence

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  • Simon Lodato
  • Christos Mavridis
  • Federico Vaccari

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of bureaucracy on policy implementation in environments where electoral incentives generate pandering. A two-period model is developed to analyze the interactions between politicians and bureaucrats, who are categorized as either aligned -- sharing the voters' preferences over policies -- or intent on enacting policies that favor elite groups. The findings reveal equilibria in which aligned politicians resort to pandering, whereas aligned bureaucrats either support or oppose such behavior. The analysis further indicates that, depending on parameters, any level of bureaucratic influence can maximize the voters' welfare, ranging from scenarios with an all-powerful to a toothless bureaucracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Lodato & Christos Mavridis & Federico Vaccari, 2024. "Political Pandering and Bureaucratic Influence," Papers 2402.17526, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2402.17526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Pandering and pork-barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 79-93.
    4. Peter Bils, 2023. "Overreacting and Posturing: How Accountability and Ideology Shape Executive Policies," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 18(2), pages 153–182-1, April.
    5. Awad, Emiel & Karekurve-Ramachandra, Varun & Rothenberg, Lawrence, 2023. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Battle for Credit," SocArXiv ajrey, Center for Open Science.
    6. Federico Trombetta, 2020. "When the light shines too much: Rational inattention and pandering," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 98-145, February.
    7. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
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