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Dancing with Donald: Polarity in the 2016 Presidential Election

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  • Robert Chuchro
  • Kyle D'Souza
  • Darren Mei

Abstract

In almost every election cycle, the validity of the United States Electoral College is brought into question. The 2016 Presidential Election again brought up the issue of a candidate winning the popular vote but not winning the Electoral College, with Hillary Clinton receiving close to three million more votes than Donald Trump. However, did the popular vote actually determine the most liked candidate in the election? In this paper, we demonstrate that different voting policies can alter which candidate is elected. Additionally, we explore the trade-offs between each of these mechanisms. Finally, we introduce two novel mechanisms with the intent of electing the least polarizing candidate.

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  • Robert Chuchro & Kyle D'Souza & Darren Mei, 2019. "Dancing with Donald: Polarity in the 2016 Presidential Election," Papers 1901.07542, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1901.07542
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    5. Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter.
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