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Tilting the playing field. Do Double Simultaneous Voting System and Apparentment Lists contribute to subnational party hegemony?

Author

Listed:
  • José J. Bercoff

    (Universidad Nacional de Tucumán Argentina)

  • Osvaldo Meloni

    (Universidad Nacional de Tucumán Argentina)

  • Juan Manuel Tabuenca

    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Argentina)

Abstract

This paper contributes to the political competition literature by providing empirical evidence of the influence of Double Simultaneous Voting System (DSVS) and Apparentment Lists (AL), in force in several Argentine districts since 1987, on party hegemony and the concentration of the party system. Results from a panel data of 9 gubernatorial elections and all 24 argentine subnational jurisdictions show that these electoral systems favor the persistence of the incumbent party in office, diminish the effective number of parties, and improve the probability of victory of the incumbent party. DSVS and AL generate a profusion of subgroups that take advantage of preexisting party fragmentation, clientelistic networks and large vertical fiscal imbalance

Suggested Citation

  • José J. Bercoff & Osvaldo Meloni & Juan Manuel Tabuenca, 2024. "Tilting the playing field. Do Double Simultaneous Voting System and Apparentment Lists contribute to subnational party hegemony?," Working Papers 302, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:302
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/302.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Osvaldo Meloni, 2016. "Electoral Opportunism and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 145-167, May.
    2. Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April.
    3. Mark P. Jones & Osvaldo Meloni & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 135-156, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political competition; electoral systems; subnational politics; Double simultaneous voting system; Apparentment lists.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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