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s there an electorally-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina

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  • Osvaldo Meloni

    (Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Argentina)

Abstract

In the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at the top of mayor concerns of Argentinians which leaves open the question about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 24 districts about anti-crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections approach? Do they carry out short-run actions in the proximity of elections, to increase their chances of remaining in office? This paper investigates the existence of electorally-induced crime rate fluctuations in Argentine subnational districts. I estimate a dynamic panel data that spans all 24 Argentine districts for 24 years. I cover 142 gubernatorial elections from 1983 to 2007. I documented the existence of a V shape relationship between crime and the gubernatorial electoral calendar.

Suggested Citation

  • Osvaldo Meloni, 2018. "s there an electorally-motivated crime rate cycle? Evidence from Argentina," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 1102-1110.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-01017
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral cycles; Crime rate; Dynamic panel data; Argentina;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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    Access and download statistics

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