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Winning Competitive Grants For Regional Development in Albania: The Role of Local Leaders

Author

Listed:
  • Elvina Merkaj

    (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

  • Riccardo Lucchetti

    (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

  • Fabio Fiorillo

    (Universita' Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)

Abstract

In post-socialist countries, regional development and decentralization has been a fast process accompanied by strong deregulation and significant institutional changes. Despite the reforms in Albania, local government units (LGUs) are often significantly underfunded, understaffed and depend heavily on grants from the central government. The focus of this study is the Regional Development Fund (RDF), a competitive investment fund which finances LGUs investments. We aim to analyze the factors influencing the LGU access to RDF funds, based on a survey with LGU leaders. Political affiliation of the LGU leader, networking and the knowledge the LGU leader about the RDF procedure are important factors affecting access to RDF funds. Interestingly, however, the factors that correlate with the number of applications are different from those that explain the success rate of those applications. Our findings call for a further institutionalization of the process in order to reduce the (informal) personal and political affiliation based influences in the RDF competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvina Merkaj & Riccardo Lucchetti & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "Winning Competitive Grants For Regional Development in Albania: The Role of Local Leaders," Working Papers 422, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:422
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local government funds; political manipulation; network; leadership; Albania;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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