An Agenda For The Design And Study Of International Environmental Agreements
AbstractThe combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies to generate interesting new theoretical and practical insights into the workings of IEAs. Note: Forthcoming in Ecological Economics
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utah State University, Economics Department in its series Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers with number 28353.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
international; environmental; agreement; design; game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50;
Other versions of this item:
- Batabyal, Amittrajeet A., 1996. "An agenda for the design and study of international environmental agreements," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-9, October.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996. "An Agenda for the Design and Study of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 9620, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
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