On the formation of international migration policies when no country has an exclusive policy-setting say
AbstractThis paper identifies the migration policies that emerge when both the sending country and the receiving country wield power to set migration quotas, when controlling migration is costly, and when the decision how much human capital to acquire depends, among other things, on the migration policies. The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of bilateral agreements in the shape of transfers to support migration controls, and in the shape of joint arrangements regarding the migration policy and the cost-sharing of its implementation. The paper shows that in equilibrium both the sending country and the receiving country can participate in setting the migration policy, that bilateral agreements can arise as a welfare-improving mechanism, and that the sending country can gain from migration even when it does not set its preferred policy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF) in its series Discussion Papers with number 117431.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Human capital formation; International migration; Migration policies; Welfare analysis; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Labor and Human Capital; F22; I30; J24; J61;
Other versions of this item:
- Stark, Oded & Casarico, Alessandra & Devillanova, Carlo & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2012. "On the formation of international migration policies when no country has an exclusive policy-setting say," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 420-429.
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
- Bianchi, Milo, 2013.
"Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/5377, Paris Dauphine University.
- Milo Bianchi, 2008. "Immigration policy and self-selecting migrants," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587710, HAL.
- Milo Bianchi, 2012. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Working Papers halshs-00670037, HAL.
- Bianchi, Milo, 2006. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 627, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 02 Nov 2006.
- Fan, C. Simon & Stark, Oded, 2007.
"International migration and "educated unemployment","
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 76-87, May.
- Stark, Oded & Fan, C. Simon, 2006. "International Migration and "Educated Unemployment"," Discussion Papers 7126, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Djajic, Slobodan, 1989. "Skills and the Pattern of Migration: The Role of Qualitative and Quantitative Restrictions on International Labor Mobility," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 795-809, November.
- Jess Benhabib & Boyan Jovanovic, 2007.
"Optimal Migration: A World Perspective,"
NBER Working Papers
12871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2008.
"A General Model of Bilateral Migration Agreements,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
755.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Stark, Oded & Fan, C. Simon, 2007.
"The Brain Drain, "Educated Unemployment," Human Capital Formation, and Economic Betterment,"
7122, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- C. Simon Fan & Oded Stark, 2007. "The brain drain, 'educated unemployment', human capital formation, and economic betterment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15, pages 629-660, October.
- Oded Stark & C. Simon Fan, 2007. "The Brain Drain, “Educated Unemployment,” Human Capital Formation, and Economic Betterment," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 07-01, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
- Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
- Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
- Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2002.
"Inducing human capital formation: migration as a substitute for subsidies,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 29-46, October.
- Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2001. "Inducing Human Capital Formation: Migration as a Substitute for Subsidies," Economics Series 100, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
- Woodland, Alan D. & Yoshida, Chisato, 2006. "Risk preference, immigration policy and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 500-513, December.
- Tito Boeri & Herbert Brücker, 2005. "Why are Europeans so tough on migrants?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 629-703, October.
- Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
- Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & Suwankiri, Benjarong, 2011. "Migration and the Welfare State: Political-Economy Policy Formation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262016109, December.
- Stark, Oded & Zakharenko, Roman, 2011.
"Differential Migration Prospects, Skill Formation, and Welfare,"
119111, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Oded Stark & Roman Zakharenko, 2012. "Differential Migration Prospects, Skill Formation, and Welfare," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 657-673, 09.
- Stark, Oded & Zakharenko, Roman, 2011. "Differential migration prospects, skill formation, and welfare," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 22, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.