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Risk Aversion in Nash Bargaining Problem With Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Outcome

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  • Safra, Zvi
  • Zilcha, Itzhak

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  • Safra, Zvi & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1988. "Risk Aversion in Nash Bargaining Problem With Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Outcome," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275444, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275444
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E & Rothblum, Uriel G, 1982. "Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 639-647, May.
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    Keywords

    Financial Economics; Risk and Uncertainty;

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