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Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology

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  • Peterson, Jeffrey M.
  • Boisvert, Richard N.

Abstract

A pollution reduction program is designed where information about both techno logy and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for selfselection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.

Suggested Citation

  • Peterson, Jeffrey M. & Boisvert, Richard N., 2001. "Designing Nonpoint Source Policies With Limited Information About Both Risk Attitudes and Production Technology," Working Papers 127661, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:cudawp:127661
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.127661
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Boisvert, Richard N. & Peterson, Jeffrey M., 2001. "Control Of Nonpoint Source Pollution Through Voluntary Incentive-Based Policies: An Application To Nitrate Contamination In New York," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 1-12, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patterson, Jeffrey M. & Boisvert, Richard N., 2002. "An Incentive Compatible Self-Compliant Pollution Policy and Asymmetric Information on Both Risk Attitudes and Technology," Working Papers 127318, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.

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